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FOURTH AMENDMENT
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a Home While They Seek
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by Ralph C. Anzivino
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of law at Marquette University
Law School in Milwaukee, Wis.;
RCAnzivino@aol.com
or (414) 288-7094.
ISSUE
Can the police "impound" a home
that they have probable cause to
believe contains contraband while
they secure a search warrant?
FACTS
On the afternoon of April 2, 1997,
two officers of the Sullivan, Ill.,
police department went to the home
of respondent Charles McArthur and
his wife, Tera McArthur. The home
was a trailer located in a trailer
park. Tera had asked them to
accompany her to the trailer to
"keep the peace" while she moved
her belongings out. After Tera
removed her possessions from the
trailer, she told the officers that her
husband (respondent) had "dope" in
the trailer. Assistant Police Chief
John Love asked Tera to describe
what she had seen. Tera said she
had seen the respondent hide "pot"
under the couch in the trailer.
Officer Love knocked on the door of
the trailer, and McArthur answered.
Officer Love told McArthur that his
wife had informed the officers that
he had marijuana in the trailer.
Respondent denied the accusation.
Officer Love asked the respondent if
he could enter the trailer and
search it, but the respondent
declined to permit the officer to
search without a search warrant.
When this conversation concluded,
McArthur was outside the trailer.
Respondent did not testify that he
was asked or otherwise compelled
to step out of the trailer. Officer
Love testified that he did not recall
whether he asked the respondent to
come outside or whether the
respondent did so on his own.
Officer Love asked Tera whether she
would be willing to tell a judge what
she had seen, and she agreed to do
so. Officer Love's partner then left
with Tera to go to the local prosecu-
tor's office for the purpose of seek-
ing a search warrant for the trailer.
Officer Love remained behind with
McArthur. He did not arrest
McArthur or tell him that he was
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not free to leave. When McArthur
asked Officer Love if he could go
back inside the trailer to wait for
the warrant, Officer Love told him
that, until the warrant was or was
not obtained, he would not be
allowed to reenter the trailer unless
accompanied by the officer.
Respondent and Officer Love waited
outside the trailer for about two
hours before other officers returned
with a search warrant for the trailer.
At least twice McArthur entered the
trailer to get cigarettes and call fam-
ily members. Each time, Officer
Love stood in the doorway of the
trailer and observed him. Officer
Love made no further entry into or
search of the trailer. At the suppres-
sion hearing, the respondent admit-
ted that his purpose in asking to go
back into the trailer was to destroy
the evidence concealed there, and
that he would have done so had he
been permitted to enter alone. He
did not, however, announce that
purpose to Officer Love. At some
point during the two hours, the
respondent's mother came to the
trailer. She was also told by Officer
Love that she could not enter
unaccompanied. When other offi-
cers returned with the warrant,
McArthur showed the officers where
a small quantity of marijuana and
paraphernalia were hidden. He was
then arrested.
Respondent was charged with two
counts of unlawful possession of
drug paraphernalia and one count of
unlawful possession of less than 2.5
grams of marijuana, all misde-
meanor violations. He filed a motion
to suppress the items found at his
residence. He argued that barring
him from entering the trailer while
the search warrant was sought had
amounted to an illegal arrest, and
that the marijuana and parapherna-
lia recovered when the warrant was
executed were the products of that
illegal arrest.
After an evidentiary hearing at
which the respondent and Officer
Love testified, the trial court
granted the respondent's motion to
suppress. The State appealed, and
the Appellate Court of Illinois,
Fourth District, affirmed. People v.
McArthur, 304 Ill. App. 3d 395, 713
N.E.2d 93 (4th Dist. 1999). The
appellate court did find that the
police officers had "probable cause
to secure the residence."
Nevertheless the court held that
barring McArthur from reentering
his home without police accompani-
ment amounted to a "constructive
eviction." The court distinguished
this case, wherein the respondent
was on the premises at the time the
home was seized, from one in which
the police secure premises and bar
entry by anyone thereafter arriving.
Similarly, the court distinguished
that portion of the opinion in
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S.
796, 813 (1984) (opinion of Burger,
C.J., joined by O'Connor, J.), that
declared that the seizure of a resi-
dence presents a lesser interference
with the occupant's possessory
interest if the occupant is then in
custody. The court noted that in
this case, the respondent was pre-
sent but not arrested at the time he
was barred from entering his trailer.
Finally, the court concluded that
Officer Love conducted both a
search and a seizure when he stood
in the doorway of the trailer to
observe the respondent as he
made phone calls and retrieved his
cigarettes.
The State filed a timely Petition for
Leave to Appeal to the Supreme
Court of Illinois. The Illinois
Supreme Court denied the petition.
People v. McArthur, 185 Ill. 2d 651,
720 N.E.2d 1101 (1999). The State's
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to
the Supreme Court of the United
States was filed on Jan. 4, 2000, and
granted on May 1, 2000. People v.
McArthur, 120 S.Ct. 1830 (2000).
CASE ANALYSIS
The Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution restricts
only searches or seizures that are
unreasonable. This key principle
requires the balancing of competing
interests. In each instance, the
reviewing court must balance the
intrusion on an individual's personal
Fourth Amendment rights against
the public interest underlying the
state's execution of a particular pro-
cedure. United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); see
also United States v. Place, 462 U.S.
696 (1983).
In this case, the State argues that its
interest in securing evidence before
its destruction outweighs the lesser
Fourth Amendment interests impli-
cated by the temporary seizure of
the respondent's residence. First,
the State notes that by barring
McArthur from entering his home
while a fellow officer sought a
search warrant, Officer Love select-
ed a course of action deliberately
designated to mitigate the nature.
and extent of the intrusion on the
Fourth Amendment rights of the
respondent. The procedure effected
a seizure and thus implicated inter-
ests that figure differently in Fourth
Amendment analysis than those
implicated by a search. A seizure
affects a person's possessory interest
in the property seized, while a
search affects the maintenance of
personal privacy. Although both
interests are protected by the
Fourth Amendment, the physical
entry to an individual's home (the
search) is considered the chief evil
against which the wording of the
Fourth Amendment is directed. The
State asserts that only a seizure
occurred here, not a search.
Next, the State argues that the
infringement upon the respondent's
possessory interests imposed by the
seizure of his home was mitigated in
significant ways. First, the seizure
Issue No. 2
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was provisional. It was undertaken
only to allow officers to obtain a
search warrant and was in effect
only as long as it took to obtain one.
Second, the approximate two-hour
period was reasonable. The record
supports no suggestion that the time
period was excessive or that the
officers were not diligent in seeking
the warrant or returning to conduct
the search. During those two hours,
Officer Love's partner was able to
return to the local police station
with the respondent's wife, prepare
a warrant, a complaint, and two affi-
davits; locate a judge; submit them
for his review; obtain his approval;
and return to the respondent's
home. Two hours is an eminently
reasonable time within which to
accomplish those tasks.
In addition, Officer Love effectively
tempered the effects of the seizure
by permitting McArthur to enter the
trailer, albeit only under his obser-
vation. These instances did not
compromise the respondent's priva-
cy rights. They did permit him to
exercise some possessory interest in
his home by using the telephone
and obtaining cigarettes. Therefore,
even the interference with his pos-
sessory interest in the home was
mitigated to some extent.
Finally, McArthur was not personal-
ly seized when he was barred from
reentering his trailer. He was not
told he was under arrest, was not
physically restrained, and was free
to go anywhere in the world except
back into the trailer by himself. He
was not seized at all. Therefore, the
impoundment procedure resulted in
an infringement of the respondent's
Fourth Amendment rights that was
substantially mitigated and consid-
erably less extensive than would
have been occasioned by a search.
On the other hand, the State's inter-
est in this case was considerable.
The Supreme Court has accorded
substantial weight to the need of
investigating authorities to prevent
the destruction, alteration, or con-
cealment of evidence of crimes.
Officer Love's decision to secure the
premises was based on his desire to
prevent anyone from disturbing evi-
dence, and specifically his concern
that the respondent could dispose of
or destroy evidence. The presence
of the respondent at the scene unre-
stricted by arrest made that con-
cern acute. Respondent's own inten-
tions elevated that concern beyond
the level of speculation. Had Officer
Love not prevented him from doing
so, the respondent would, by his
own admission, have destroyed the
evidence hidden in the trailer. In
this case, the officer was correct to
be concerned about the potential
destruction of evidence.
The State believes the balance of
competing interest tilts in favor of
approving the impoundment proce-
dure. The State's interest in preserv-
ing the marijuana and paraphernalia
hidden in the respondent's home is
meaningful. The presence of the
respondent, the person with the
strongest motive to destroy the
items, made such destruction a
strong possibility. Respondent's
admitted intentions made it a cer-
tainty. On the other side, while
McArthur did suffer some loss of the
use of his home, this deprivation
was confined to a reasonable period
directly related to the securing of a
warrant. More critically, the
impoundment procedure provided a
means to avoid the more grave
intrusion of entry to preserve evi-
dence. Impoundment, therefore,
satisfies the Fourth Amendment by
providing a model of restrained
police conduct and by eliminating
the need for a greater intrusion.
Impoundment provides a middle
ground that accommodates a police
officer's investigative interest at
a lesser cost to the rights of the
individual.
The State also contends that the
Fourth Amendment does not
require that the police obtain a
seizure warrant before temporarily
seizing a residence while awaiting a
search warrant. The officer's deci-
sion to secure the premises in this
case accords with the Supreme
Court's prescription for preserving
the status quo, pending the issuance
of a search warrant. The Supreme
Court has stated that police may
seize property that they have proba-
ble cause to believe contains contra-
band for the limited period required
to obtain a warrant. In Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), the
Court condemned the warrantless
search of a suitcase found in a car
but observed that the police had
acted "commendably" in seizing the
suitcase. The proper course of
action, in the Court's view, would
have been to hold the suitcase,
unopened, until a warrant could be
obtained. These principles should
apply with equal force to a resi-
dence, so long as privacy interests
are not compromised.
The State admits that in securing
McArthur's residence and barring his
entry, Officer Love acted without a
warrant. Indeed, the very purpose of
his actions were to freeze the cir-
cumstances in place while a search
warrant was sought. It is not disput-
ed that Officer Love had probable
cause to believe that marijuana was
secreted within McArthur's trailer.
Respondent's wife had told him it
was there. She had seen it herself.
When Officer Love asked her specifi-
cally where it was, she told him
where it was hidden. Because he had
probable cause and because the
seizure of the respondent's home did
not involve entry and lasted only
long enough to allow officers to
obtain a judicial search warrant, the
seizure of McArthur's trailer required
no warrant or showing of particular-
ized exigent circumstances.
(Continued on Page 92)
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The State argues that because
Officer Love was entitled to bar the
respondent from entering his trailer
unless escorted, the officer's obser-
vations of McArthur inside the trail-
er was a consensual acceptance of
that condition. On at least two occa-
sions while they waited for the war-
rant, Officer Love permitted
McArthur to enter the trailer while
under his observation. Each time
Officer Love stood in the doorway of
the trailer and watched McArthur
but made no further entry or
search. The Illinois Appellate Court
determined that, by these entries,
Officer Love had also "secured the
dwelling from the inside" and con-
cluded therefrom that the officer
had executed a warrantless, illegal
search of the trailer.
The State argues that the real con-
sequence of these brief and cabined
entries was to lessen the intrusion
upon respondent's Fourth
Amendment interests by actually
permitting him to continue to exer-
cise some possessory rights in his
residence. Because Officer Love was
entitled to secure the residence as
he did in order to prevent the
destruction of evidence, he was
entitled to bar McArthur's entry.
Respondent's decision to accept
Officer Love's conditions was there-
fore voluntary on his part, and the
officer's presence in the doorway
was consensual. In fact, Officer
Love's terms essentially empowered
both the officer and the respondent.
Officer Love was entitled to keep
the respondent out of the trailer
entirely. Similarly, had the respon-
dent desired to prevent Officer
Love from entering, he could have
done so by simply staying outside
himself.
Respondent, on the other hand,
believes that the State's interest in
preserving the evidence of his mis-
demeanor offenses does not out-
weigh his possessory and privacy
rights in his home. The State asserts
that the infringement on McArthur's
possessory interests was mitigated
by the fact that he could reenter his
home under police observation.
Furthermore, the State claims that
the two-hour dispossession of
McArthur's home was an eminently
reasonable time in which to obtain
a search warrant. Respondent urges
the Court to reject these arguments.
The police conduct cannot be
judged in the context of a simple
external seizure of McArthur's
home. Rather, one must consider
the totality of the impoundment
process, including the warrantless
entries into the respondent's
premises and the restraining of his
person from going into his own
home.
A seizure of personal property rea-
sonable at its beginning may
become unreasonable due to its
duration if its manner of execution
unreasonably infringes possessory
interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment. A 90-minute detention
of luggage has been held unreason-
able. U.S. v. Place, 462 U.S. 696
(1983). Here, the seizure of
McArthur's home lasted nearly two
hours. Thus, the respondent con-
tends, the seizure resulted in a sig-
nificant deprivation of his possesso-
ry interest in his home, and the
State's attempt to balance its inter-
est in prosecuting him for two mis-
demeanor offenses solely against a
two-hour external seizure of his
home is not correct. Rather, one
should balance the State's interests
against the unreasonable seizure of
his home and the warrantless
entries. Respondent says that,
viewed in this context, the balance
clearly weighs in favor of protecting
his possessory and privacy interests
in his home.
Respondent contends that the
police conducted a warrantless
search of his home that was unrea-
sonable under the Fourth
Amendment. It is axiomatic that the
physical entry of the home is the
chief evil against which the Fourth
Amendment is directed. The Fourth
Amendment has drawn a firm line
at the entrance to the house. Absent
exigent circumstances, that thresh-
old may not reasonably be crossed
without a warrant. The burden is on
the government to demonstrate exi-
gent circumstances that overcome
the presumption of unreasonable-
ness that attaches to all warrantless
home entries. When the govern-
ment's interest is only to arrest for a
minor offense, that presumption of
unreasonableness is difficult to
rebut.
Although the possible destruction of
evidence is a commonly claimed
exigency, the circumstances under
which officers may make warrant-
less entries into homes to prevent
the loss of evidence has not been
defined. The circuit courts of appeal
have consistently held that warrant-
less entries into private residences
are not permissible on the grounds
of fear that evidence was likely to
be lost. Rather, a showing that
destruction of evidence was immi-
nent was required. Several state
courts have also agreed that "exi-
gent circumstances" requires more
than a mere apprehension that evi-
dence will be destroyed.
In this case, Officer Love admitted
that he entered into McArthur's
home despite being denied permis-
sion to search. Therefore, the bur-
den is on the State to demonstrate
exigent circumstances that over-
come the presumption of unreason-
ableness that attached to Officer
Love's entries. The State argues that
the exigency of imminent destruc-
tion of evidence was present.
However, there were no exigent cir-
cumstances justifying the warrant-
less entries into the respondent's
home that were not created by the
Issue No. 2
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police officers themselves. Although
McArthur was clearly aware of the
police presence outside his home
while his wife moved her things out,
the 2.3 grams of marijuana, one-hit-
ter, and pipe were not in "immi-
nent" danger of destruction.
Respondent did not make any
attempt to destroy the 2.3 grams of
marijuana or the drug paraphernalia
until the police knocked on his
door, told him that his wife had
reported drugs inside, and asked if
they could search. Thus, the police
had no specific evidence of immi-
nent destruction sufficient to satisfy
the exception to the warrant
requirement for Officer Love's
entries into the respondent's home.
Moreover, assuming that the evi-
dence of the respondent's misde-
meanor offenses was in imminent
danger of destruction, preserving
the 2.3 grams of marijuana, one-
hitter, and pipe did not justify the
warrantless entries into his home in
order to secure them. The State's
interest in prosecuting the respon-
dent for two misdemeanors did not
qualify as exigent circumstances
justifying Officer Love's warrantless
entries into his home. Once Tera
McArthur told the police about the
marijuana and paraphernalia inside
the trailer, the officer could have
easily left with her (without telling
the respondent about the incrimi-
nating information), obtained a
search warrant, and returned to
retrieve the evidence and arrest the
respondent. Thus, the evidence like-
ly would have remained intact if the
officers had left with Tera McArthur
and complied with the warrant
requirement. The officers created
the exigency concerning the
destruction of evidence when they
informed the respondent that they
believed he had marijuana inside. A
ruling that this type of conduct con-
tributes to the creation of the exi-
gency of destruction of evidence will
result in officers' being able to cre-
ate such exigencies at will and
bypass the warrant requirement.
The State made a number of argu-
ments to justify the police entry
into McArthur's home. First, the
State argued that because Officer
Love was entitled to prevent the
respondent from entering his home
without a police escort, the respon-
dent consented to Officer Love's
entries each time the respondent
wanted to go inside his home.
Second, the State argued that the
real consequence of Officer Love's
brief entries was to lessen the intru-
sion upon the respondent's posses-
sory interests by permitting him to
exercise some control over his
home. And finally, the State
observed that Officer Love saw
nothing of consequence as a result
of his looks inside the respondent's
trailer, and, therefore, his entries
could not have contributed in
any way to the discovery of the
contraband.
Respondent believes each of the
State's arguments should be reject-
ed. The State's first argument relies
on a belief that Officer Love did not
violate McArthur's Fourth
Amendment rights by impounding
his home. In other words, the State
is proposing a rule that provides
that if the State does not illegally
seize a home or its owner when it
prevents him from entering, then he
automatically consents to the police
entry into his home when the owner
subsequently desires to enter for
any reason. This argument ignores
the true meaning of "consent" to
search. Here, the respondent
expressly told Officer Love that he
could not go inside his home with-
out a warrant. Thus, he did not vol-
untarily consent to Officer Love's
entries. Likewise, he did not give his
implied consent by entering into his
own home to make phone calls to
his mother and sister and to get cig-
arettes. Respondent was told that he
could not go inside his home alone
so that he could destroy evidence.
Officer Love refused McArthur's
requests to go inside alone. Clearly,
Officer Love entered the respon-
dent's home under color of office.
Respondent's entries into his home
accompanied by Officer Love were a
submission to authority,. not a vol-
untary consent.
Likewise, the respondent rejects the
state's argument that Officer Love's
entries lessened the intrusion upon
his possessory rights. Officer Love's
entries constituted an even greater
intrusion upon the respondent's
Fourth Amendment rights. Although
McArthur was concealing evidence
of two misdemeanor crimes, his
expectation of privacy in his home
was not diminished. He was entitled
to keep Officer Love outside his
home until the police had a warrant.
Under the State's argument, his pos-
sessory rights could not be enjoyed
without giving up his right to priva-
cy in his own home. Given that
invasion of the home by the govern-
ment is the chief evil at which the
Fourth Amendment is directed, it is
hard to imagine how the intrusion
upon the respondent's rights was
lessened by Officer Love's warrant-
less entries.
Respondent rejects the State's asser-
tion that since Officer Love did not
see anything incriminating during
his entries, they should not be con-
sidered illegal. The State is essen-
tially arguing "no harm, no foul."
That is not the standard for deter-
mining whether an impermissible
warrantless entry occurred. Officer
Love's warrantless entries prevented
the respondent from destroying his
2.3 grams of marijuana, one-hitter,
and pipe. Thus, Officer Love's war-
rantless entries significantly con-
tributed to the discovery of the evi-
dence against the respondent.
Accordingly, the State has not met
(Continued on Page 94)
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its burden with respect to justifying
Officer Love's warrantless entries
into McArthur's home.
Respondent posits that the
impoundment of homes to preserve
evidence should not be permitted
where only misdemeanor offenses
are involved. Under the Fourth
Amendment, the Supreme Court
attempts to balance the govern-
ment's interest in enforcing laws
against the individual's privacy
interest. When applied to impound-
ment cases, the balancing should
reflect an effort to look to the scope
of the particular intrusion, in light
of all the exigencies of the case,
including the seriousness of the
offense. The seriousness of the
offense is relevant in determining
whether the police violated the
Fourth Amendment with respect to
a warrantless entry into a home.
Thus, it is logical to look at the
nature of the underlying charge in
determining whether a warrantless
seizure and impoundment of a
home violates the Fourth
Amendment.
Respondent also asserts that the
trend of recent decisions is to
uphold warrantless entries into pri-
vate residences to prevent the
destruction of evidence only when
relatively serious offenses are
involved. The Supreme Court uses
the distinction between serious and
petty offenses in determining
whether the constitutional guaran-
tees of trial by jury and legal coun-
sel are available. Thus, the question
becomes how to articulate a stan-
dard with respect to the seriousness
of an offense for courts and police
officers to readily apply in deter-
mining whether the seizure and
warrantless entry into a home is
constitutionally permissible. The
courts have recognized the need for
easy-to-apply and familiar standards
to guide police officers who have
only limited time and expertise to
reflect on and balance the social
and individual interests involved
in the specific circumstances they
confront.
Respondent contends that the line
with respect to impoundment and
warrantless entries should coincide
with the line most jurisdictions use
to distinguish misdemeanors and
felonies. The felony/misdemeanor
line has clear boundaries that are
easily discerned and applied by offi-
cers and courts. Application of this
distinction would achieve the same
results within a state and similar
results from state to state. Finally,
the rule could not be easily manipu-
lated or abused in cases such as the
respondent's, in which the police
could have questioned Tera
McArthur concerning the amount of
marijuana she saw in her husband's
home. Thus, the police should be
able to readily ascertain at the
scene whether they are dealing with
a felony or misdemeanor offense.
Finally, the respondent postulates
that society will not suffer serious
consequences if the impoundment
of homes, including warrantless
entries to preserve evidence, is dis-
allowed in misdemeanor cases. An
analysis of the costs and benefits of
a rule prohibiting seizures of the
home in order to preserve evidence
in misdemeanor cases comports
with the Fourth Amendment's rea-
sonableness requirement.
Accordingly, McArthur urges the
Supreme Court to draw the line
between constitutionally permissible
and impermissible impoundment of
homes based on the seriousness of
the offense. Respondent believes
such a balancing test reveals that
the impoundment of his home and
the warrantless entries by Officer
Love violated the Fourth
Amendment. As reflected by the
nominal sentences for both misde-
meanors for which the respondent
was charged, the State of Illinois did
not have a great interest in protect-
ing society at large from his activi-
ties within his own home. Moreover,
the public's interest in prosecuting
him is outweighed by the advantage
of requiring the police to obtain a
warrant before impounding the
home of a person suspected of com-
mitting a misdemeanor.
SIGNIFICANCE
New ground will be plowed in this
case under the Fourth Amendment.
Warrantless entries into one's home
by the police are not permitted
under the Fourth Amendment,
absent exigent circumstances. In
the absence of exigent circum-
stances, however, where the police
have probable cause to believe a
home contains contraband, will the
police be able to "impound" the
home for a reasonable time to
secure the issuance of a search
warrant?
Searches and seizures under Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence are gov-
erned by the standard of reason-
ableness. Reasonableness is general-
ly determined by balancing the
intrusion on a citizen's rights
against society's interest in enforc-
ing the law. Impounding a home is
less than a full intrusion into one's
home. On the other hand, the
impoundment in this case was for
the arrest of a misdemeanant, not a
felon. How will the Supreme Court
balance these competing interests?
Will they approve a new "impound-
ment" process as a law enforcement
tool? If so, will the Supreme Court
limit home "impoundment" to
felony cases only? The answer will
be forthcoming shortly.
Issue No. 2
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ATTORNEYS FOR THE
PARTIES
For the State of Illinois (Joel D.
Bertocchi (312) 814-3698)
For Charles McArthur (Jeff Justice
(217) 422-9800)
AMIcus BRIEFS (AS OF
OCT. 6)
In Support of the State of Illinois
The States of Ohio, Alaska,
Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa,
Maine, Maryland, Minnesota,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah,
Vermont, and Washington, and the
Commonwealths of Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, and Virginia (Robert
C. Maier (614) 466-8980)
The United States (Seth P.
Waxman, Solicitor General,
U.S. Department of Justice (202)
514-2217)
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